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 This thesis is concerned with tracing out  the manifold connections between personhood 
and morality to argue that morality is based on fundamental properties of the person, and 
therefore a moral philosophy that  ignores or truncates the person is one that  fails to understand 
the central function of morality in our social practices and understanding of the self. It is at  the 
same time to argue that morality is integral to personhood and enters the construct  of the person 
at  the most  basic level. My method is to exploit  our sense that our concept of the person exists to 
capture that which makes us more than natural beings.
 First, persons must self-define. What it is to be a person is not given. Persons, and each 
person, must create an ideal of the person to act, and through action try to realize that ideal and 
through that process in fact realize themselves. Second, the human psyche has its own needs and 
drives unrelated to those of the physical being that propel the being towards personhood. Third, 
persons have depth. When we recognize a being to be a person, it is evidence of depth that we 
recognize. Without depth persons would not be. We have evolved a specialized vocabulary -- a 
moral vocabulary -- that both recognizes that depth and facilitates its creation. Together these 
entail that the person cannot be constructed without that construct being eventually set in moral 
terms, and that sociality is a basic unit of analysis of the person: persons exist as beings who 
recognize each other and exist in a matrix of recognition within which persons come to be. In as 
much as existing as a person is the proper form of existence for our kind and personhood is 
dependent on the voluntary activity of other persons, existence as a person must as far as possible 
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Understanding moral responsiveness -- that we take and make moral judgments and 
considerations seriously  and are often enough motivated to act on them, even against 
strong desires or interests otherwise -- is a long-standing philosophical problem. In this 
thesis I suggest  that our difficulties in understanding moral responsiveness stem, at least 
in part, from both an incorrect, at least, incomplete understanding of morality and an 
inadequate understanding of our nature as persons. I believe that the moral enterprise is 
only superficially captured in such understandings of morality as “what is right and 
wrong in conduct,” “the claims others legitimately  have on you,” or “how we are to relate 
to one another,” and that we are unlikely to get the understandings we are after from this, 
in my view, truncated understanding of morality. 
 What the prevailing understandings of morality miss is a fundamental connection 
between the existence of morality and our existence as persons such that  the moral 
enterprise can’t be understood apart  from an understanding of the person nor can the 
human person be understood independently of the moral enterprise. I will argue from an 
understanding of ourselves as persons to an understanding of morality, the enterprise, and 
its proper place in human life, a position from which moral responsiveness can be more 
fruitfully illuminated.
 However before I begin I would like to say just a bit more about the modern 
understanding of morality, in particular, as expressed by  Kant. His account is particularly 
important for my purposes because his also rested on an understanding of the nature of 
the person. In brief, Kant (rightly) saw essential connections between morality, 
rationality, and personhood but erred in how he explicated those connections. He 
correctly  saw that human beings were distinguished from other animals by a capacity  for 
autonomous rational choice; but then made too much of that  insight by defining morality 
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(doing the right thing because it was the right thing) as acting according to the dictates of 
autonomous rational choice, and then defined the person as that being capable of acting 
morally. This made rationality  both the central moral concept and the defining feature of 
personhood. In addition, the concept of the person became the concept of a transcendent 
form of being -- the person was a wholly  moral being in contrast to an empirical being -- 
and morality was the characteristic activity of a person.
 While I believe Kant was correct to understand our existence as persons as an 
ontologically special from of existence and correct to see that existence in moral terms, I 
believe he erred by understanding personhood in exclusively moral terms, and erred 
particularly by identifying both morality  and personhood so closely with the exercise of a 
single capacity, rational decision-making.
 This error has had several far reaching consequences. The first is a radically 
atomistic view of the moral judge, who is in this case identical with the person, as one 
who, given data, arrives at the action any rational being would take. A second is a 
presentation of morality  as something foreign, imposed and imposing on our lives (by 
consisting in rules derived by pure reason that, because universalizable, are unavoidable). 
A third is the consequence that  someone who chooses not to do as morality requires -- but 
does not thereby do something we would judge immoral -- thereby shows himself 
degraded. Because personhood has been defined as engagement in the single activity of 
autonomous rational choosing, to choose on any other basis is to function as less than a 
person. What has persisted from Kant is an understanding of morality as rule-generating 
and of moral behavior as rule-following, and an atomistic understanding of the person as 
self-contained and self-sufficient. He was in error to reduce morality  to rational 
responsiveness and persons to rational agents.
 I contend that a moral philosophy that ignores or truncates the person is one that 
fails to understand the central function of morality in our social practices and 
understanding of the self. Therefore, in this thesis I will be concerned with tracing out the 
manifold connections between personhood and morality to argue that morality is based 
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on fundamental properties of the person. I will begin with an ontology of the person, 
showing in particular that the person can be plausibly  separated from the human being, 
while maintaining an intrinsic connection. This will provide the ground to claim that a 
whole different set of conditions apply to the existence and recognition of a person than 
of a human being. I will establish the idea of the person as a primarily non-natural entity 
-- an entity not caused to be by physical forces -- by highlighting the fundamental role 
played by the biologically based capacity for self-reflexivity. I will show self-reflexivity 
to be the basic proposition by which to understand personhood. 
 Next I will show that although non-natural, the person is phenomenally  distinct, 
an existence in its own right by showing the psyche has its own needs and drives, distinct 
from those of the human being -- in particular, its own survival drive capable of 
overriding the drive for physical survival, even as it depend, for its existence, on physical 
existence. Following that I will show that the psyche is not just phenomenally distinct but 
phenomenally real -- i.e., the psyche has depth. Without depth our personhood would be 
in question. Depth evolves through the application of a specific set of evaluative 
attitudes, the reactive attitudes, directed only at persons; a language of character and 
motivation; a self-reflexive consciousness and the kind of questioning it requires and the 
ideas created give us that depth. It is a real, not fictitious, property of persons, and we can 
conclude persons are inherently moral and ontologically real.
 Then, having established the person as having a “special ontological status” as 
metaphysically  real and inherently  moral, I will show how the non-naturalness of the 
person requires a recognition requirement (an essential sociality  condition for 
personhood). This will show recognition is a basic unit in the analysis of the person. This 
means that the person cannot be correctly conceived as the self-sufficient, bare 
individual, a construal which takes the end-point -- the fully constituted person -- as the 
starting point of the analysis. It does not  consider that personhood might be a generated 
state.
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 An essential sociality  requirement means that we are fundamentally situated, as 
persons, in relationships of recognition with other persons, without which persons would 
cease to be. This circumstance means that personhood is dependent by definition on 
voluntary activity  of other persons, which means persons are fundamentally situated in a 
moral problematic, and that morality exists necessarily when persons exist.
 I then explore this problematic through the idea of absolute needs for personhood, 
what they require of other persons and how they ground fundamental structures of 
morality. The absolute needs of persons are the needs persons have, which, if radically 
unmet, will result in the person ceasing to be. Exploring these needs will highlight just 
how embedded in morality the person is and how central morality  is to our distinctive 
existence as persons.
 Finally, I will conclude with some remarks about a distinctive mode of moral 
failure highlighted by the analysis of the person that  is generally obscured under the 
prevailing, atomistic conception of the person and the resulting failure to put recognition 
at the center of morality. The generally highlighted and much discussed moral failure is 
moral weakness -- the failure to act on one’s (sound) moral judgments The failure this 
analysis highlights, centered as it is on recognition, is that of moral neglect -- the failure 




Section 1: The Special Ontological Status of the Person
1.1 The Person is Non-Natural
I am beginning this exploration of the person’s special ontological status with the idea 
that the person is a non-natural entity  because that idea has been attached to the concept 
from its genesis. We know that we are a species of animal, and as animals are materially 
caused to be and function under the sway of physical law; but for as long as we have been 
self-aware we have known that we are not simply  animals, we are something more than 
animals, signaled by that  very  self-awareness. However we have tried to explain it we 
have used the concept of the person to capture it.
 Our concept of the person has evolved over time, beginning as an inter-relational 
status term and then to a mark of legal status and then, with the arrival of the modern era, 
the person has become increasingly  conceived as a psychological entity.1 The transition 
has been from a construal of the person as a public social entity to that of a private 
individual entity, but its original sense contains an important insight worth preserving. 
Originally ‘person’ represented a status. It came from ‘persona,’ which meant facade or 
assumed character. One who donned a persona acted under the rubric of that persona 
rather than as his private self. In an early Greek use, ‘persons’ were those men with the 
leisure and resources to participate in public life. They  did so under the guise of 
personhood to emphasize that they were participating not as private citizens with their 
private concerns, but as public voices who deliberated disinterestedly, but not necessarily 
dispassionately, about matters of common concern.
 The primary  activity of persons was to make normative judgments: What should 
we do with our resources? Should we build more schools or more roads? How should we 
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1 Poole, R. (1996). "On Being a Person." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(1): 38-56.
respond to the posturing of our near neighbor? How should we treat the young? The old? 
The infirm? Yes, these are social-political questions, but  they are also questions of public 
identity  and what vision of what was possible for people they wanted to express. Settling 
practical matters often involves larger visions of what is important in life and how a 
people wants to present itself to other people. The point is that they  were equally persons 
with the same reflective, deliberative capabilities and (ideally) respected and related to 
each other on that recognition.
 The earliest understanding of the person, and ourselves as persons was as rational 
deliberator -- Man was the reasoning animal -- but emphasis on the ability  to function 
with reasons generally as Man’s distinctive ability and that which made him more than an 
animal, obscures the even more distinctive and unnatural ability -- and need -- to function 
with normative terms such as worth and importance, in this instance to create a species 
persona. Man was the rational animal because he needed reasons to determine values. 
This early  conception of the person captures an irremovable normative aspect to 
personhood.
 Some of the earliest and most persistent philosophical questions were addressed 
to our own identity, proof that we have long been both fascinated and puzzled by  the 
sheer fact of our existence. What is Man? How ought a Man to live (as a Man)? How 
ought we to live (as Men together)? These were among those earliest questions. The 
sense was that Humankind was not “at home” in the world the way that other creatures 
were. He didn’t belong and had to both figure out and in some sense justify his existence. 
These opening questions of philosophy are the outward signs of the special ontological 
status of the person, and they are the beginning of ethics.
 These questions suggest his constitution is incomplete and that he, himself, must 
supply what is lacking. What he senses himself as without  -- as not having been endowed 
with by nature -- is an essence, an identity, and some central purposes by which to guide 
himself in his practical life. Who he is, or rather what he is, is up  to him. In this sense, 
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that his nature -- what he is and that he is -- is not decisively set by nature and entirely 
caused by physical forces, the person is non-natural.
 This puts the person outside the Newtonian causal order, which is a status we 
have long recognized ourselves to have, which as I’ve said, the concept ‘person’ evolved 
specifically in response to. The classification ‘personhood’ is a classification based on 
features not found in nature and not determined by nature. The feature that has 
historically stood out is an ability to intervene in causal processes in a way that is itself 
non-conditioned, often described as our ability  to “overcome” or “transcend” nature 
through motivationally effective rational processes. This is the self-determining ability 
that constitutes “the power of intellectual being to determine their own wills from 
reflective judgments with motivational force” -- a power to suspend acting on desires and 
consider their objects, to examine them, weigh them, and form reflectively  informed 
practical judgments.2 In virtue of this unnatural ability we are “free,” and we account for 
this capability by positing the logical construct of the rational agent (sometimes also 
called the self), an entity  who “acts on choice and chooses using reasons.”3  Because this 
feature, the rational agent or self,  “is not something that can be absorbed into the class of 
events (even though how the self stands apart from events, and what the self is, is very 
unclear)” the self is the seat of moral responsibility.4 -- providing an initial understanding 
of the enterprise of morality as one required by, and addressed to, that  very  non-
naturalness that sets us apart.
  The modern era in philosophy has been characterized by a tendency  to focus 
excessively on rational agency in a very  narrow sense as the quintessential signal of 
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2 Darwall, S. (1995). The British Moralist and the Internal "Ought", 1640-1740. New York, Cambridge 
University Press.
3 Searle, J. R. (2001). Rationality in Action. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
4 Nagel, T., in Hampton, J. (1989). "The Nature of Immorality." Social Philosophy and Politics 7(1): 22-44.
personhood, but thankfully we are now moving away from that.5  The narrow focus 
neglects other capabilities essential to and signaling of personhood and is false to our 
experience of each other as persons and how we recognize others to be persons. Two 
capacities definitive of persons left out by  the narrow focus on the person as a being 
capable off being convinced by reasons are a capacity for depth and one for imaginative 
invention.6 Without depth, the presence of a complex inner life, the person would not be; 
without imagination we would not have ideals or conceive of how life might be different 
from what it is and ourselves different from how we are (among many other things). All 
of these capabilities have their source in the biology-based feature of reflexivity. It makes 
sense to consider the person as centrally self-reflexive and to locate the source of his non-
naturalness in the self-reflexive consciousness and the questions that result.
 The predicament of the self-aware being is this. He is aware that  he must make 
practical choices, and he is aware of his options as choices that he can examine and 
qualitatively evaluate; but if he is to act out of self-awareness he can’t  simply choose as a 
natural being would, he can’t simply act on his strongest desire.7  His choice will be 
filtered through that self-awareness. He will ask: Should I satisfy my strongest desire? Is 
that really what  is best for me? -- but if he doesn’t know who he is, if he has no idea what 
sort of being he is or is trying to be, how can effectively choose to best benefit himself? If 
he doesn’t know what his existence is about or what he wants to do with it, again, how 
can he choose? If he doesn’t  know what he is trying to be, he won’t know what he should 
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5Frankfurt, H. G. (1988). Identification and Wholeheartedness. The Importance of What We Care About. 
New York, Cambridge University Press: 159-176.    Also Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). The Sources of 
Normativity. New York, Cambridge University Press.
6 Hampshire, S. (1983). Morality and Conflict. Morality and Conflict. Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 
140-169.Vico distinguished the two as the power to put thoughts in order (intellectual understanding) and 
the creative power to generate new meanings and new forms of language and culture (imaginative 
invention). Hampshire, following Vico, saw no reason to elevate intellectual understanding over 
imaginative invention and no reason to think intellectual understanding was more distinctive of human 
beings. 
7 Wolf, Korsgaard, Taylor, and Frankfurt all identify the capacity to qualitatively evaluate as our 
distinguishing capacity. That is, they all see a self-reflexive consciousness as our key structural feature.
be trying to do. To choose, he needs to know what he is about -- what his character and 
dispositions are, what his central purposes are, what he holds dear, and what he aspires to. 
 Frankfurt expresses this in his conception of what persons essentially are. We are, 
he says, the sort of creature who cares about eh sort  of creature we are. Persons are 
beings who understand themselves not only  by  their desires and attractions but by  what 
they  consider important as well. Persons can ask if what  attracts them is really important 
to them, and they care about what they do, think, feel, and aim at.8
 He needs to know what he should do, and without a nature or identity, he does not 
refer to anything. The formal structure of the person as centrally self-reflexive requires 
that he create for himself some coherent evaluative and motivational structure to go on in 
life -- and if he is going to understand himself as a unitary  being he needs to provide 
himself with the idea of one. Thus, persons must self define. Persons, therefore, are 
beings so constituted structurally that a person must have an ideal of the person to be a 
person and nature does not provide one.
 An ideal of the person is necessary  because it addresses the whole being; it paints 
a complete picture of a particular nature and identity and a motivational and evaluative 
core. The question of the self-reflexive being is not simply how should I move myself 
and what should be important and more important  to me, but who am I, what sort of 
being am I and what sort of life is possible for that sort of being? He need I conception of 
a whole discrete entity. The ideal must be one he can hold dear because holding to it  will 
require effort and because it  will be the core of his identity; it is his conception of the 
kind of being he is and what he should be aspiring to and expecting of himself in his 
conduct. A deep attachment to the ideal will yield commitments to the character traits and 
principles of conduct required by  that ideal.9 A set of commitments or norms alone won’t 
9
8 Frankfurt, H. G. (1993). On the Necessity of Ideals. Necessity, Volition, and Love. New York, Cambridge 
University Press: 108-116.others?
9 Scheffler, S. (1979). "Moral Scepticism and Ideals of the Person." Monist 62: 288-303, Scheffler, S. 
(1992). Human Morality. New York, Oxford University Press, Velleman, J. D. (2002). "Motivation by 
Ideal." Philosophical Explorations 5(2): 89-103.others?
be sufficient because he will just ask why those norms and why those as a complete set. 
An ideal of the person is a stopping point to such questioning because it is a starting 
point. In this way persons are non-natural: their nature is an ideal, a moral product.
 As signaled in this section’s opening questions, persons are centrally self-
reflexive, and that capacity for awareness of their mental content is the source of their 
special ontological status. Persons cannot avoid asking basic questions about their 
essence, identity, and central purposes, and must  provide for themselves answers, which 
they  do with an ideal of the person, a conception of a species nature and the kind of life 
such beings would live that would be both enticing and meaningful. Persons have a 
special ontological status because although biologically based they are inherently moral.
 In logical terms, self-reflexivity implies that the person cannot be philosophically 
constructed without some idea of morality.
1.2 The Person is Phenomenally Distinct
My aim in this section is to establish that psychic existence is an existence in its own 
right, which I will do by  arguing that the psyche has needs and drives of its own, distinct 
from those of the human being and not aimed at benefitting the human being. Achieving 
this further supports the plausibility  of separating the person and the human being such 
that we may speak of a distinct act of “seeing the person” that is not an act of seeing the 
human being. 
 Just to be clear, there is no suggestion of dualism here. The person is not 
separable from the human being empirically; personhood is a consequence of the 
physiology of the human being, which is such that, under the right conditions, a self-
reflexive consciousness develops. The separation is a logical one to draw out the 
specialness of personhood as a form of existence.
 We know that the person is an embodied thing, but the person is not simply  an 
animal with states of consciousness. To have a person those states of consciousness must 
form their own whole and be the states of consciousness of a unitary self (the “I” that is 
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the referent for the mental states of any single consciousness). To understand the psyche 
as a unified, persisting entity  with its own needs and drives that it seeks to satisfy and 
express, we should begin with the nature of the mind.10
 Let’s consider that  the mind, as a whole, has a nature, that  the word “mind” does 
not just name a receptacle in which a variety of functions are located but that the mind is 
itself an entity  with a function or a character, and that character is rationality. We know 
that various rational processes occur in the mind, but what if the mind as a whole is also a 
rational processor? If so, then it  would function to apply norms of rationality -- such as 
consistency, coherence, stability, and significance (rational sense or meaning) -- to 
whatever it contacted, be it sense perceptions; thoughts, feelings, and desires; intentions 
and possible intentions.11 
 With thoughts, feelings, desires and other produced mental states, the effect will 
be to tend to accept those that  meet the norms and reject those that do not. Similarly for 
possible behaviors. Now, consistency, coherence, stability  and significance have to be in 
response to something. It assess against what has been accepted so far. This does not 
mean the structure becomes ever more fixed, only that  change is more likely to be 
incremental rather than wholesale.
 So we will say that human mind functions with two types of rationality: active 
and reactive. The active rationalities are the variety of reasoning and choice-making 
processes we engage in when we think. Reactive rationality, the reasoning that 
characterizes the mind as a whole is not a process or calculating method at all but a mode 
of experiencing (which is why  what is perceived as rational -- overwhelmingly 
11
10 I use “mind” and “psyche” interchangeably, but I prefer “psyche” because I am identifying personhood 
as a psychic form of existence and “mind” has connotations of a property of persons which “psyche” does 
not have. I am not identifying the person with the mind and wish to side step issues regarding unconscious 
mental content or a tight connection between personhood and consciousness.
11 Searle, J. R. (2001). Rationality in Action. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.He argues there is no separate 
cognitive faculty of rationality; that once you have intentional states, and especially language, you already 
have constraints of rationality. They are they way we coordinate our mentality. Also Frankfurt, H. G. 
(1958). "The Dependence of Mind." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19: 16-26. Intelligibility 
and logical coherence are needs we have: our minds are constrained by rationality. Bratman, M. E. (2003). 
"Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency." Philosophical Review 109(1): 35-61.
reasonable -- has greater motivating force than what has been rationalized into 
reasonableness). Reactive rationality is the distinctive mode of experiencing of a self-
reflexive being, that  is, it  is our distinctively human form of rationality  that  is also our 
distinctive mode of experiencing.
 The rationality of the mental drives the psyche towards unity and subsequently to 
a stable character and personality structure. The resulting unified psyche is the self -- the 
unitary agent that represents the coherence of the mental activities of a single person.12 
The drive is biological in origin but once the brain-mind is sufficiently organized for 
rational processes to be in place becomes an independent psychological drive impelled by 
the rationality that characterizes the mental.
 The drive to achieve and maintain psychic unity  drives a motive of self-
consistency in both thought and action, a tendency to do what we know and to behave in 
accord with our self-concept.13  This often involves telling a story. If the story makes 
sense to us then the action makes sense for us as one we would do and we become 
motivated.14  Out of this impulsion of the mind to sense and coherence a character 
emerges, and this impelling is very  strong. Making sense of psychic stimuli (which 
includes our own behavior, which we can both observe and imagine, and the content 
generated by the mind’s own processes) is not  something we can choose not to do. In 
practice, we become very disturbed and frustrated when we cannot succeed in making 
rational sense of something or are blocked from doing so.15 We will invent a sense rather 
than accept nonsense or confusion. 
 I have so far described this rational character of the mental as a “reactive” 
rationality because it functions conservatively. It does not  produce a something new, as 
12
12 Gaskin, R. (1990). "Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions?" Classical Quarterly 40(i): 1-15.Gaskin 
Homeric Heroes
13 Velleman, J. D. (2000). "From Self Psychology to Moral Psychology." Philosophical Perspectives 14: 
349-377. Velleman, J. D. (1985). "Practical Reflection." Philosophical Review 94: 33-61.
14 Velleman, J. D. (1999). "A Rational Superego." Philosophical Review 108(4).
15 Velleman, J. D. (1985). "Practical Reflection." Philosophical Review 94: 33-61.
reasoning processes do. Instead it accepts or rejects content in so far as it can or cannot 
make sense of it against its rational norms, which themselves refer to rational structures 
and their associated content already in place. 
 The rationality of the mental, and its reactive functioning, supports recent 
proposals by  Frankfurt that a capacity  to identify  with, to accept as his own, his 
tendencies to be moved is essential to personhood.16  The function of the mind is 
consistent with this idea of “identifying” with some content rather than others as being 
“of the person” or not, and a sense of connection to certain objects that has its source in 
the person, not just  in the mind. What we experience as the tendency to identify with 
some motivations -- as being of us -- and to disavow others as simply occurrences is just 
this functioning in action.
 This reactive rationality  also functions as a drive, a conservative drive of the 
structured psyche to maintain its unity, which is to say, its identity  as a persisting thing -- 
and because it is a drive grounded in rationality it is a distinctly psychic drive, a psychic 
survival drive or psychic drive to persistence.17 New information, new possible actions, 
will be examined against the stable, coherent, consistent structures of character, 
motivation, evaluation, self-conceptions, ideals and experiences already in place and 
permitted or rejected on that basis.18 In this way, these rational mental forces can give us 
the experience of certain behaviors and actions being “required” by an ideal, that it is 
difficult to do otherwise; it feels somehow “wrong” or a “betrayal” to do otherwise.
 We see this drive to persistence at work whenever we want to do something and 
find that we cannot until we find a reason that makes the action makes sense as one that 
we would do. I may want to perform the actions and yet, until I can explain it sensibly  as 
13
16 Frankfurt, H. G. (2002). Reply to Gary Watson. Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Frankfurt. 
S. Buss and L. Overton. Cambridge, MIT Press: 160-164.
17 Hampshire, S. (1971). Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom. Freedom of Mind. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press.
18 This is not the only ground for choosing actions; it is just how this one works. It’s results would be just 
one consideration among others, though it would, by its nature, be a strong one.
an action I would do I am stuck, even if I am aware of generally  good reasons for 
performing the action. This is a common experience. Once we hit on an acceptable 
account our mind seems to allow us to do it. We also see it quite often in everyday self-
defeating behavior when the psyche’s drive to persist and maintain unity inclines toward 
permitting actions consistent  with the established self-concept and overrides rational 
considerations favoring a healthy change. 
 To establish the psyche as a distinct existence from that of the human being, 
though, we must go further.  Consider our experience. We do experience some things as 
threats specifically  to our personhood that are not threats to our physical survival. One 
example is terror. We are terrified of becoming terrified. It is the state of being terrified 
that we principally fear. Initially our fear was of the object, but once having experienced 
terror our fear becomes of the state itself, and of the object only because we fear it may 
bring on the state. What, specifically, we are terrified of is becoming so overwhelmed by 
sheer panic that  our psychic unity dissolves. We know that when in a sheer panic we do 
lose all sense of self. Generally this lasts for only  a short time, but we remember and 
realize it  is possible that if the state lasted longer psychic unity, the self, the person might 
not return and in effect we would have died. Not the body but the person. 
 We are also aware that we are capable of self-sacrifice for an ideal or other 
cherished attachment; that for some, how they live, what they express with their actions 
and choices is more important than that they live. This behavior, in which needs and 
drives of the psyche to in some sense preserve itself appear to contradict and override the 
self-preservation drive of the human being. In these instances it the overriding need is for 
behavior consistent with the requirements of the ideal, and especially with the ideal of 
oneself as a person (one’s conception of what a person well-representing personhood 
would do) that ultimately  motives -- and what is this but the psyche acting to preserve its 
own existence and identity? In these instances reasons of psychic survival can and do 
override reasons of physical survival (even while fully realizing that the psychic entity 
will cease to exist with the cessation of the physical one). 
14
 When the action is done consciously (rather than in moment of overwhelming and 
unthinking zeal) several processes are involved. Reflection and imagination work to put 
the proposed action into a pleasing and motivating narrative that makes rational sense of 
the act as one he would perform given his history and self-conception, and to show it as 
consistent with and furthering larger cherished ends. The reflective imaginative task is 
necessary  because the psyche, as a rational entity, imposes its own conditions of 
rationality on any proposed action and will tend not  to permit an act that don’t make 
sense under those conditions. If the attachment is strong enough to be integrated into the 
person’s personality structure or identity, the action would be permitted under the aspect 
of preserving that identity.
 Over time an identity  and character become established -- and core to the 
structure will be an ideal of the person, as demonstrated in the previous section. Once an 
ideal of the person is established it becomes important that our actions not only are 
instrumentally successful but that they are consistent with or “express” our beliefs about 
what sort of being a person ought to be or be aspiring toward. In this way ideals, which 
often direct us toward changing our current dispositions, can accomplish such change in 
this otherwise conservative setting.
 That the psyche must “allow” a choice so that choice must make rational sense 
within the context of that psyche does not mean that the psyche (person) cannot act on 
external or justifying, reasons or is not responsive to reality  in the reasons it finds salient. 
It would be among rational norms to tend to act on the perceived true and to be 
committed to truth. One of the norms of rationality is significance, and one way of 
finding meaning or making rational sense of something is by finding reasons.
 Let’s back up a step. Recall what the mind essentially mind is -- an organ of 
awareness. The mind exists in so far as awareness occurs.19 For there to be space in the 
mind for thinking to occur, the mind must become selective about what will be permitted 
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into conscious awareness. In this way a criterion of importance enters and we begin 
“seeing with interest” and seeing concerning our interests. This is not just a passive 
filtering but an active orientation, particularly when it is motivated by a need for answers 
-- in our particular case of an idea of the person and of how to move oneself through life 
as a thinking being who must life important and their way  of being helpful to their 
experience rather than harmful -- there is a motivation to find and assess ways of being, 
and action is required to assess them. In this way an original drive to psychic unity 
evolves into a drive to character and its display to provide the answers required by a 
reflexive self-consciousness.
  In this way reactive rationality, which functions to make sense of stimuli and 
possible behavior according to norms of rationality, also functions as an outward 
impelling force. The need for reasons propels this outward, seeking, investigative 
orientation. The motive is conservative and self-serving, but the result is an expanded 
awareness and openness to reality  as it is. In this way this reactive rationality becomes an 
active force. By compelling questioning and so awareness of, and desire to seek, reasons, 
this rational function acts as a distinctively psychic drive on which a person moves out 
into the world (and brings the world into himself).
 We have now two distinctly psychic drives, one to the unity and persistence of the 
psyche, and the other, an outward reason-seeking drive that serves the need of a reflexive 
consciousness for rational grounds on which to make choices. Both exist to address needs 
of the psyche rather than the natural being. 
 There is one other, which I shall call a psychic drive to presence, or alternately a 
drive to self-assertion. This distinctly social drive has long been recognize and often 
regarded as a problematic drive. Hobbes called it the “desire for glory,” and went so far 
as to describe it as a “craving” for esteem in the eyes of others.20 He described glory as:
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A desire for personal advancement that is somehow biologically intrinsic and that 
is so strong in us that when we cannot see it satisfied by the reality  of our own 
powers and abilities in the world, we lie to ourselves or seek out the lies of others 
in order to inflate our sense of who, and what, we are.21
Bishop Butler lists “fame” among the basic human desires, right along with food and sex, 
and it is not a desire based in self-love.22 Instead it is an outward directed desire for social 
esteem. It seems clear they are identifying the same drive and is quite telling that both see 
it as a biologically based drive that clearly presupposes sociality. It seems universally 
accepted that a desire to be liked and admired is a universal endowment of persons. 
Anyone observing a young child would be hard pressed to deny a basic drive to self-
display  and a desire for recognition. The general understanding is as a desire to be 
recognized, esteemed, and thought highly of. In a negative sense it is to have social 
power. However, I think a drive to social power would be a different drive with a 
different source. A drive to, or desire for, social power is more like the animal drive to 
dominance, which has primarily  a sexual function than a drive aimed at self-constitution 
through self-display. It might come out of desires not to be pushed around by others. One 
the other hand “fame” and “glory” seem terms more appropriate for social power drives 
of the kind just described and seem rooted in a desire not to have to obey  anyone or 
account to anyone. In a sense, then, it is an antisocial drive, the opposite of what we are 
seeking.
 The drive I wish to isolate and recognize is that one of the young child -- a 
psychological drive to insert  itself into the world and be recognized as existing and as the 
author of its actions. Usually this desire constitutes about the time the child grasps that  it 
is a self and its mental content is private and only  known by others if she makes it known. 
In other words, a drive to presence or self-display or self-assertion becomes operative 
when the child realizes it is a person, a being with both agency and depth.
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 This drive-desire pair is plausibly  biologically based and survival oriented, 
because persons exist as public entities. Persons come about in the context  of 
relationships and are recognized as existing with a vocabulary the applies only to 
persons.23  This drive has two aims, constitution of the person and membership in the 
larger community of persons, a community of recognition within which persons come to 
be.
 This drive to presence or to self-assertion is clearly a psychic drive originating 
from a self-reflexive consciousness and the activity it requires. This activity  includes 
constructing a coherent, viable ideal of the person, something that requires display 
followed by correction or adjustment (by himself or others); and arriving at a sense of 
himself that is not an ideal of conduct but the actuality of likes and dislikes through 
which he constitutes himself as an individual object that  he can address and guide as an 
object.
 For the child, once he realizes persons (and so he himself) are private entities, and 
that others are also persons just as he is and can be known to him and he to them, but 
only by revealing himself and engaging others such that they  reveal themselves, he will 
be motivated to self-display and discovery. Persons among persons is the proper mode of 
existence for persons and so it stands to reason persons (and nascent persons) have within 
themselves resources to propel them towards that proper form of existence. 
 In this section I have shown that psychic existence is a distinct existence; that it  
has its own drives, grounded in rationality  though expressed through biology, aimed at 
securing its own existence. I have further shown these independent psychic drives 
produce personhood and therefore that the person is distinct from the human being but 
inseparable from it.
1.3 The Person is Phenomenally Real
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The aim in this section is to establish the person as not only ontologically real but 
phenomenally real to further establish the person as a distinct entity, intangible but there 
for immediate perception. This account challenges any view that equates personhood 
with a legal or political status, a function or faculty of the mind (the person as of bare 
rational agency), or a point of view. Showing persons to be phenomenally real will 
support the position that recognizing the existence of a person -- “seeing” the person -- is 
a different act than seeing the human being, and is the primitive moral act.
 Persons are phenomenally  real because persons have depth. Persons have 
traditionally  been identified by agency, but along with agency persons can be identified 
by evidence of an “inner life” of some complexity. If we were to imagine meeting some 
being, what would be our most direct evidence we were meeting a person? Assuming 
some means of communication (itself a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
personhood) we would determine the being a person based on the kinds of thinking it 
could engage in. We would note whether it  had a self-concept and referred to itself in the 
first person, whether it could examine and qualitatively evaluate its mental states (not 
simply  have them), whether it judged its own behavior and that of others in moral terms, 
whether it had a conception of itself as having a life that was its own to direct as it  could 
within its circumstances, whether it  was a source of action (an agent), could apprehend 
and act from reasons, and whether it cared about some things and was guided by  those 
cares. In other words, if it  revealed itself to be self-aware, self-evaluative, with cares and 
concerns, a multifaceted and layered mentality, and a life to live according to some 
conception of “well,” we would judge it a person.
  Depth or “inner being” is evidence of personhood. Depth has its source in 
reflexive self-consciousness and the questions formed and ideas required by that 
embodied consciousness. 
 Earlier I argued that the person was non-natural because the person could not be 
constructed without that construction eventually  being set in moral terms because of an 
essential dependence on an ideal of the person, which itself is set in a moral vocabulary. 
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Now I am going to argue that those moral terms are exactly  what realizes the person. That 
is, persons are phenomenally real because they are inherently moral.
 The vocabulary of character and motive (vices and virtues for example) and the 
vocabulary of reactive attitudes (praise and blame, but  also admiration, indignation, 
gratitude, respect, contempt, and shame, to name a few) -- inherently moral vocabularies 
-- are the vocabularies with which we realize persons.24  These vocabularies function 
because persons have the structure that they do. A reflexive self-consciousness and the 
questions it requires in tern requires a vocabulary  suitable to both posing and answering 
those questions. We needed a vocabulary to conceive an ideal of the person and so we 
needed to name behavioral tendencies and became conscious of them under those names 
to consciously direct ourselves by them and to both recognize them and instill them in 
others (most notably our children). We also needed a vocabulary  suitable for judging 
behavior and actions by its worthy or unworthiness according to an ideal of conduct.
 We created a vocabulary that both describes and reifies persons. It marks beings 
out as persons because it is a vocabulary that only applies to and would only be 
recognized by beings that could see their mental states and their actions as objects that 
could be judged, and were beings who defined their own essence and identity.  
 The existence of reactive attitudes in particular indicates that  there are ways we 
think about persons and ways we think about objects and they are not the same ways. We 
address reactive attitudes to the person not at her action. Even though they  are responses 
to the action they  address the person, as accountable self, and they address the quality of 
the intention behind the action. Without them we can only address the action as a 
happening in the world. We can’t address it as an expression by a person that  does or does 
not reflect well against some idea of how a person ought or ought not conduct herself. We 
can’t praise or disapprove the thinking that led to her choice, the considerations she 
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thought relevant, or what stood out to her as important. That is, we can’t  evaluate it  in a 
way that brings her into it. The vocabulary of reactive attitudes recognizes persons have 
depth and addresses them on that very  supposition. We can only  note what she considered 
and whether her choice sensibly followed.
 Reactive attitudes are our way of nudging each other along, for obvious social 
reasons of not wanting those we share a community with to fall far short of the behavior 
that makes communal life successful, but also because having lived up to an ideal, even 
in just in this action is something that seems to mean much to us. When an action meets 
the inner ideal that is a mentally  satisfying experience, as such. To have another 
recognize it is another recognizing that as well. Reactive attitudes presuppose ideals (and 
so presuppose inwardness, self-reflexive consciousness and the questions that arise). This 
is our only vocabulary for this function. It is a vocabulary that recognizes this normative 
feature of all actions of persons. It is vital for its obvious regulatory  function but it is also 
vital for its purely  recognition function. It recognizes that persons have depth. Without 
this recognition of their depth (which is the basic truth about persons) persons will cease 
to be. Recognition of a foundational motivating ideal is participation in the ongoing 
conversation about personhood that realizes persons. “To drop  this vocabulary  of reactive 
attitudes is to drop the vocabulary responsive to and representative of an intangible but 
non the less real mode of existence.”25 With reactive attitudes we remind each other of 
what we should and should not be and how well we are doing in that regard. We use them 
to instruct, which presupposes we use them to recognize -- and they are constant 
reminders that personhood is a community effort and being a person is a kind of trying 
(to be a person is to try to be a certain kind of person). Without these reminders we may 
stop evaluating against our ideal (we would cease evaluating according to what we 
believed was important and worthy and valuable generally and regarding the life we were 
trying to lead and the kind of person we were striving to become) and the ideal itself 
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become opaque. We would lose our depth and our personhood itself would be in 
question.
1.4 The Person is Essentially Social
 The previous sections have shown that, contrary to the traditional construction of the 
person as an isolated, discrete entity, the construction of the person is deeply  social. 
Intrinsic sociality is a basic unit  of the analysis of the person. Intrinsic sociality means 
persons are fundamentally situated, as persons, in relations of recognition without which 
the person would cease to be. It also means that personhood is dependent by definition on 
the voluntary activity of other persons. Let me trace the ways.
 First, infant human beings are dependent on the activity of persons to become 
persons themselves. The current view among developmental neuroscientists and 
developmental psychologists is that human beings are not born “minded” (with minds). 
They  are born with the potential to become minded and in the normal course of events do 
so. A mind “emerges” as the brain undergoes a massive self-organizing in response to 
external and internal stimuli. In ways we may never understand, mechanical processes in 
the brain become the rational processes of the mind. The research shows it is crucially 
important to the emergence of a healthy, stable individual from this process, that it  occur 
in the context of consistent, affectionate relationships with caregivers. The infant (nascent 
person) becomes a person by being affirmed as a person (though she is not yet  one) and 
treated as a person (by  recognizing and encouraging minded behaviors).26 Young children 
are further encouraged into personhood by being treated as a person (in age appropriate 
ways) and having the (age appropriate) responses of a person expected. It would seem 
that person-among-persons is foundational to human consciousness.
 Second, self-reflexivity implies the need for an ideal of the person and that  ideal 
must come from somewhere; third, self-reflexivity and the requirement for an ideal of the 
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person implies the need for a specialized vocabulary that realizes us as persons and 
allows persons to address each other in that recognition; and fourth, the requirement of 
recognition itself implies the need for a community within which persons exist as beings 
who recognize and are recognized by other persons.
 In the previous several sections I made a case for plausibly separating the person 
from the human being while maintaining an intrinsic connection by locating the source of 
our personhood in the biologically based phenomenon of a self-reflexive consciousness. 
My aim was to highlight personhood as a distinct form of existence with its own needs 
and existence conditions distinct from those of the human being. Doing so drew out the 
deep dependence of personhood on sociality, and especially recognition.
 I also drew out the special ontological status of the person which consists in an 
intrinsic sociality or intrinsic morality. Considering sociality, persons have a special 
ontological status because persons, although biologically  based, exist as beings who 
recognize each other and live within a matrix of recognition within which human beings 
become persons. Their special ontological status is signaled by the questioning, and the 
kinds of questions, self-reflexivity  forces, but it source is the sociality requirement. 
Considering morality, self-reflexivity places demands that must be met and one of those 
is for an ideal of the person. The second order nature of self-reflexivity means the 
motivations supplied by nature are insufficient they can be called into question and 
subjected to qualitative evaluation and something is needed to evaluate them against, and 
that something needs to function as a cohering myth about what a person is, how a person 
should live and what should a person be concerned with: an ideal of the person. 
 This special ontological status has moral entailments. Morality is inescapably part 
of the logic of the person: it is not possible to construct the person without any idea of 
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morality.27  An ideal of the person is a moral ideal because “having a moral ideal is 
wanting to be a certain kind of person; wanting to have one character trait rather than 
another, having at least some motivation to live in a certain way  and having something to 
guide him in so living” and this precisely describes the function of an ideal of the 
person.28 Persons presupposed to be centrally motivated by an ideal of the person and our 
responses to them presume that they are acting out of an ideal, rather than natural cause. 
That is part of our presupposition of agency. Therefore, if persons exist then necessarily 
morality exists.
 This special status has consequences for our understanding of community as well. 
Persons emerge and acquire an identity in the context of a community. Because the 
community  does all of supplying the vocabulary with which persons are realized, 
overseeing its application, and supplying or assessesing the ideal, the community is 
inherently a moral community.
 The most important moral entailment, though, of intrinsic sociality is the person’s 
dependence for his existence by  definition on the voluntary activity of other persons. 
Personhood requires recognition and recognition cannot be compelled. Therefore, 
recognition by  a person that some other being is also a person is the primitive moral 
activity and the basis for a moral claim on recognition.
 This analysis of the person reveals the person as dependent by definition on 
recognition and the ability to recognize. This essential and constitutive dependence on 
recognition is implied by reflexivity (the distinctive feature of persons) and so we cannot 
even begin to talking about persons as isolated, discrete entities. 
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 The modern idea of the person starts from an abstract, fully individual personhood and 
then claims the person’s relations to others are accidental features of personhood, rather 
than intrinsic and essential ones. This view has two problems that the analysis here 
reveals.  One is that construing the person as an isolated, discrete entity misses the core 
feature of the unity of the person, which requires a social context. A unified psyche is a 
precondition for personhood and emerges in the context of warm and responsive 
relationships. Also, autonomy requires a unified psyche because autonomy requires an 
effective evaluative and motivational standpoint. Thus the autonomous agent is an 
intrinsically social construct as recognition is necessary  to produce that very  autonomy. 
The other is that constructing the person from the bare individual and treating 
relationships of recognition are treated as secondary or contingent rather than intrinsic 
and essential both distorts how personhood is constructed and distorts the relationship of 
morality  to the person. Rather than central and inseparable from our identity  morality is 
conceived of as law-like external constraints and requirements that, while we 
acknowledge as necessary, we have a hard time explaining how they  should fit into our 
lives and that we are and should be moved by  them, even when he don’t wish to be. The 
individualistic construal of the person has let to a preoccupation with the philosophical 
problem of the Other and an emphasis on weakness and obscuring of neglect as sources 
of moral failure.
 Lastly, this analysis of the person suggests a moral naturalism based on the 
following pair of claims: one, that morality is involved essentially and constitutively in 
personhood; and two, that the person is the foundation for morality  and the source of its 
basic structure. This naturalistic account has the advantage of accommodating the 
aspiration feature of morality that rightly must be part of any correct understanding of 
morality.
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Section 2: The Dynamic Requirements for Personhood
2.1 The Absolute Needs of the Person
Thus far, the following has been established. First, the static construction of the person 
reveals needs and lacks which must be satisfied and fulfilled to achieve personhood. 
Alone, the static construction is insufficient. The static conditions for personhood must be 
augmented with dynamic conditions. Second, the person has existence requirements 
distinct from those of the human being and can be plausibly separated from the human 
being. Third, the fundamental feature of the person is intrinsic sociality: The person 
cannot be constructed independent reference to other persons. Fourth, personhood is 
logically and empirically  dependent on recognition, rendering recognition by a person 
that another is also a person the primitive moral act.
 The static construction of the person shows lacks which must be addressed: the 
lack of an essence, an identity, a motivational core and set of evaluative commitments, 
and a presence in the world, which a being must have to be a person. The person is 
radically dependent on sociality to fill these lacks. He is dependent on sociality as well 
for opportunities to participate in certain activities that further his self-constitution and 
are constant reminders of his personhood. Those constituting activities include forming 
and maintaining cared about attachments; acting, and reflectively acting in particular; and 
recognizing and being recognized by others. This and the following sections address why 
opportunities to engage in these activities are absolute needs for personhood.29
 As I define it, an absolute need is an unconditional need, a need which must be 
met for the maintenance of the organism. If it is not  met, the organism will be absolutely 
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harmed. In addition (although this is already implied in “maintenance” condition) 
absolute needs are needs of individuals as members of their kind. That is, they are needs 
for species existence. This means my claim is that we have specific, absolute needs as 
persons distinct from any other absolute needs we may have. That is, I am considering 
persons to be a species or species-like. If we do have absolute needs as persons, those 
needs must meet whatever conditions other absolute needs meet.
 Before I consider whether they do qualify as absolute needs, let me set out why I 
think they should. First, as I will argue in the following sections, if these needs for 
recognition, to act, and to form caring attachments are not met, the person will experience 
absolute harm as a person. His personhood may become called into question and he may 
even cease to be. Second, they are modes of engagement with the world that are unique to 
persons, so that when a person acts and accounts for his action, recognizes or is 
recognized by another person as also a person, or cares about his cared about attachments 
he is functioning quintessentially as a person. Furthermore, opportunities to engage in 
those activities that signal personhood and so one status as a person can be affirmed are 
paramount because personhood is an intangible form of existence. These are absolute 
needs for personhood.
 Still, if they are to qualify as absolute needs specifically of persons then they  must 
meet any other conditions on something’s being an absolute need. So let’s examine other 
absolute needs we have and what, if any additional conditions must be met for need to 
qualify as absolute. As physical beings we have absolute needs for nutritious food, clean 
water, adequate shelter and clothing, and adequate sleep. If these needs go unmet for long 
enough we will die.
 As social animals we have further absolute needs for affection and for mental and 
emotional stimulation. As with physical needs, if these social, emotional and intellectual 
needs are not met the social animal will suffer harm, and if radically unmet will die. The 
harm suffered by the social animal is specifically to its status and functioning as a social 
animal. When a social animal infant is denied affectionate caregiving it fails to learn the 
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essential skills for appropriate social functioning. It is in this way denied the proper life 
for its form of being, and instead lives a fearful, miserable life.  The absolute needs of 
social animals are, therefore, existence requirements for them. That these physical and 
social needs are absolute is well known in the physical case and becoming well 
established in the social case.
 In the case of physical existence needs we know that they have associated with 
them physical drives aimed precisely at fulfilling those needs. This is a perfectly natural 
and sensible arrangement and is what we would presume. Hunger and thirst propel 
animals towards food and water, shivering propels them towards shelter and clothing, and 
fatigue towards sleep. In the case of social existence, feelings of loneliness and isolation 
propel the animal towards the embrace of others, and boredom towards stimulating 
activities. It should be noted though that affectionate contact does require appropriate 
responses from others -- others prepared to embrace the social seeker, to initiate contact 
with the lonely  one, or to push the bored one toward a stimulating activity. In both cases, 
the alleged absolute needs have associated natural drives to their fulfillment. Reasonably, 
if the suggested absolute needs of the person are indeed absolute needs they should have 
associated natural drives to their fulfillment as well. Since these needs are of the person 
for personhood, the associated drives should also be of the person and therefore psychic 
drives.
 We already know of several psychic drives aimed at benefitting the person. Two 
of them are rooted in the rational character of the mental and function to constitute the 
person. One is the rationality based impelling force towards psychic unity and continuity, 
in virtue of which we are selves; the other is the rationality based impelling force that 
pushes our attention outwards in search of answers and experiences to constitute a nature 
and a motivational and evaluative core. However, once the person is constituted, they 
become drives of the person, as explained. In both cases, though, the drive has its source 
in central self-reflexivity  and the needs it reveals, so both drives can be said to be of the 
person. The third is the self-assertion or presence drive that impels the person to go 
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public with himself to be recognized by and to recognize other persons to affirm his 
reality  and identity and belonging in the world. These drives together impel the person to 
act, to form attachments, and to recognize other persons and attempt to be recognized by 
them, all to confirm and sustain their own personhood.
 The absolute needs of the person are the avenues through which the person is 
constituted as a subject and becomes present in the world as an object -- the ways in 
which persons become real, to others and to themselves.
2.2 For Cared About Attachments
In section one we considered the idea of personhood and if the person could be plausibly 
conceived as a distinct entity, separable from, but intrinsically connected to, the human 
being and found it could be done. This result as an existential and moral import: 1) that 
personhood has existence requirements distinct  from and beyond those for existence of 
the human being and 2) the resources of the human being are not sufficient to produce 
personhood. Personhood requires participation by other persons, without which persons 
cannot be, the insight that  was the ground for calling persons non-natural entities and 
personhood a non-natural form of existence.
 If we return to the circumstance of the bare self-reflexive consciousness, we find 
it situated as follows. The biological endowments of the person are not self-sufficient for 
personhood. The self-reflexive psyche finds it has no essence or identity  to appeal to in 
orienting itself to objects or choosing what to do with itself. It must have these as well as 
a motivational core and evaluative commitments, and a presence in the world -- and the 
psyche is naturally driven to fill those lacks.
  A mind whose nature is rationality  will exist  only  in so far as it  engages with the 
world, and it  will engage with the world only in so far as it is drawn into such 
engagement. Thus, such engagement has a clear self-preserving function. Caring about is 
that feature, or set of features, of the mind that permits and motivates engagement with 
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features of the world. This activity is essential to unifying the psychic and creating a 
subject. To thwart the formation of such attachments, is to deny the psyche the means to 
its self-preservation -- and we have always seen satisfying foundational preservation 
drives as an obligation we all have to each other. Therefore, the need for cared about 
attachments is absolute.
 I am using ‘cared about attachment’ in Frankfurt’s sense of a motivationally 
effective attachment of the person to the object.30 Cared about attachments can be of the 
person because as states of mind they are not simply cognitive (as in valuing) or conative 
(as in desiring) but volitional (as in commitment) and emotional as well.31 The volitional 
component, its primary component, locates it within the motivational and evaluative 
structures that constitute him as a person. This makes sense also because cares, by 
definition persist, while persistence is not  definitive of either desires or values.32  The 
emotion component makes it a whole mind attachment. Emotions are often a way of 
having conscious experience of mental content we do not have direct access to because it 
is not located in area of the brain that with consciousness.  It is of the essence of caring to 
be a persisting cognitive and motivational orientation. Lacking both the affective and the 
persistence elements, neither values nor desires will bring the person into the world or the 
world into the person. 
 Cared about attachments are the means to creating a subject out of a bare reflexive 
self-consciousness. This they do by  effecting internal coherence of mental content and 
directing the will efficaciously.33  They effectively  bring the psyche, or later the person, 
into the world of objects in a coherent way, not as a wanton pushed and pulled by desires 
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such that the psyche becomes dispersed rather than unified, and coherency  of self is lost 
rather than gained.34  Without motivating, cohering attachments the person loses the 
coherence by which he is a person. He loses a sense of having boundaries -- an “I” and a 
“not I.”35 Without cares to direct his interest and attention and activities into the future 
and to anticipate it, he loses his sense of being in time, and without that he loses his sense 
of his own reality. Thus, caring attachments are essential to realizing and shaping persons 
as objects in the world. They  organize the psyche by providing structuring themes on 
which to build a stable, coherent identity.36
 They  function motivationally to direct interest, attention, and action to present an 
entity that behaves coherently over time and is thus identifiable to others as well as to 
itself. They  bring the person into the world as an object and enable him to anchor to other 
objects, allowing him to practically locate and orient himself.37 Cared about attachments 
are also the means to a person’s becoming part of the world by  bringing the world into 
himself. They function to attach the person motivationally to objects outside himself 
(including ideals and principles) and thereby  motivating the person to live and to think it 
important to live.38  Recalling the earlier discussion of the person’s quandary, making 
living important and it important for him to live were two things he needed to do to live, 
and caring about attachments effect this.
 Objects of care can be almost anything that counts as an object. This would 
include persons; activities, interests and pursuits; things; moral ideals and principles 
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integrity, kindness, bravery, conscientiousness, forthrightness for some examples of 
these).39 The care often expresses as a cared about attachment to a reason for action, such 
that the person tries to act on that reason whenever possible and cares that others act on it 
as well. He would likely  care that others were aware of it as a reason for action and 
actively promote its dissemination. Objects of care can include features of oneself. A 
person can care about his thoughts, wanting things to go well with them and wanting 
them to flourish, being pleased when they do and disappointed when they don’t. A person 
can care about his feelings and his actions in the same way, as well as what others think 
of him or how they feel about him.40  
 Caring about is an intrinsically healthy activity -- the psyche is active, aware, 
alert, and drawn outward into the world. The mental orientation is one of concern, 
attentiveness, sensitivity, and receptivity  to the object of care and what may concern it. 
Cares create opportunities for action and for reflection (particularly when things are 
going ill for the object of your care); and it doesn’t just create opportunities for action, it 
requires action because once you become personally  attached or invested in the object, its 
needs become your obligations, because you see it that way.41  The flourishing of that 
object has become part of your identity, but as a commitment to its flourishing, not as an 
extension of you.  
 Cared about attachments naturally encourage development of character traits that 
would likely be part of any viable ideal of the person, such as responsibility  (considered a 
hallmark of personhood), but also dedication, self-discipline, persistence, attentiveness, 
and joy. This is regardless of the content of one’s ideal of the person; but, simply because 
they  are character traits caring about attachments require, reinforce, and reward, they 
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would likely  be part  of the ideal. If they were not, it seem one would be at cross purposes 
with oneself. It would be a self-defeating position, which tells us that not  anything can 
function as an ideal of the person, and the personal qualities caring about attachments 
promote are necessarily components of any viable ideal of the person.
 Without  cared about attachments, many admired character traits would lose their 
underpinning, and their presence in the world compromised. Furthermore, not everyone 
will care about the same things -- that, together, we care about many different things -- is 
good for everyone: it creates a world with variety, with many topics for conversation, and 
ensures that the manifold components of the world are recognized.
  In this regard, the value status of the objects of care is immaterial. Unworthy, 
even immoral objects of care -- hate, revenge, mere accumulation of material goods, 
perfectly  ordered files -- can all perform the function. Granted it is better to have better 
cares, and it is hoped a person would realize that. Unworthy, especially immoral, cares 
are destructive in the long run, but it  cannot be denied they can fulfill the anchoring 
function, at least for a time.42 
 Cared about attachments create a stable identity that manifests itself as such in 
worldly activity  that can be recognized as such -- as a distinct individual with identifiable 
motivating attachments that both he and others can recognize as him. Our understanding 
of the person is as a being who cares about having a future and cares about the world 
having a future. When we meet with someone we know to be a person who genuinely 
does not  seem to care about either himself or anything else having a future, we worry 
about that person’s personhood. We might try to get them interested in something again, 
and we would see it as a survival matter for that person. Caring attachments provide 
opportunities for self-expression and self-originating actions, vital activities by which 
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persons connect to the world and to each other, and have a presence in the world and to 
each other.
 Through cared about attachments persons acquire the depth that marks them out 
as persons and constitutes them as objects of attachment for other persons who may  be 
intrigued by one or more of their cares and drawn into exploration of them. In this way 
both people are brought out of isolation and into that very matrix of recognition through 
which our personhood is both constituted and maintained. They may be indirectly 
brought into a matrix of recognition if they realize they are similarly attached to some 
object, in which case there is both a recognition of sameness in that respect (and so of 
personhood) followed by mutual engagement in exploration of the mutually  cared about 
object.
 Our set of cared about attachments make us individuals. What stands out to one 
person such that he cares about it  may not stand out to another. The singularity of persons 
in this respect is a highly valued feature of our species.43 It makes us interesting to each 
other and draws us into the exploration of one another and in this way realize each other’s 
depth, hence personhood.
 We have established that the person is motivated differently from the human being 
and that he must effect  his own motivational structure -- and because the person is 
centrally self-reflexive that motivational structure must be informed by  an evaluative 
stance. Forming cared about attachments is central to this project. Many things can 
qualify as objects of care and effect the creation of an identity  and a life, but there is one 
care you must have, and that is to an ideal of the person. When you care about an ideal 
you are committed to realizing that ideal. To become a person that is the relation you 
must have to some core cohering sense of yourself as a kind of being. If you don’t it can’t 
function as it must, as a core, cohering action guiding and motivating device. 
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 Without  an ideal of the person, you would not be aspiring to any particular kind of 
life, would not be aspiring to be any particular way and so would have no reason for 
consistency in your behavior. You would be neutral toward your behavior and your 
personality, and unaffected by the evaluations by  others. With no ideal of conduct you 
were trying to realize you would have no reason to realize any  particular conduct.44 In so 
far as you had a caring about attachment to something you might display those traits in 
your activity toward that object, but you would have no reason to generalize it.
 Is this possible? Whether you wanted it or not, the nature of the mind is such that 
consistency in behavior would arise, but it  would not be by choice or conscious direction. 
It would be based only  on the behaviors that happened to occur. Thus your volitional 
(motivational and evaluative) structures would express how you had behaved but  not how 
you thought you ought to, or a person ought to, behave. It would be a conditioned 
structure, not a chosen one or an instilled one, and you would be a conditioned being and 
not a person.
2.3 To Act
As caring about attachments bring the person into the world of objects and relationships, 
acting bring the person into the community of persons. Both are means to displaying 
agency, or agent authority, but more so both are means of displaying depth, or “inner 
being” to be recognized as such by other persons. In the case of cared about attachments, 
as the person takes an interest in things, and is drawn into exploration of them, and he 
finds this pleasurable and is excited by it, those interests, over time, become part  of his 
mental orientation (by the conservative, reactive rationality characterizing the mental), 
and these both become part of his structure as a person and orient him outwardly to be 
receptive to and seek out those objects and ways to be involved with them. In the case of 
reflective action, we are naturally  constituted as persons to have an interest in asking 
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questions -- especially about our own and other’s behavior -- in seeking the behavioral 
standards we should and want to have. This is a project we are biologically impelled 
toward and it is one that requires responsive judgements from others.
 What it is to be a person is not given. Persons, and each person, must create an 
ideal of the person to act, and through action try  to realize that ideal and through that 
process in fact realize themselves. This is why acting is an absolute need of the person. 
This process occurs in the context of a community, in which talk of judgment concerning 
actions presupposes a being who can and does think for himself and whose dealings with 
other’s reflects the supposition that other’s also think for themselves.
 Specifically, acting is the means to satisfy  the basic personal drive to self-
assertion (or presence) to satisfy  a basic desire for recognition, that is to say, reality. By 
acting a person affirms to himself as well as others his reality. In accounting for his action 
the person reveals his depth and affirms himself as an agent. His account may even 
amount to a self-discovery, and through acting he constitutes his character. What is more 
important, by  acting he participates in creating that very community  that in turn maintains 
his existence; therefore, by acting he participates in that form of life proper for his kind. 
He also participates in an ongoing community-wide project of species definition -- What 
is being a person; what should we be about as persons; and how do we make living as a 
person important and it important to live as a person?
 By evincing some way of being that is open to persons the actions of persons are 
inherently  moral: “Whenever we make choices we enter the domain of the moral. Our 
choices and the reasons for and against options are statements about how conduct should 
be viewed.”45  Behind our choices is our cohering, orienting ideal of the person, and as 
the earlier discussion of the psyche showed, once possessing an ideal of the person, 
aspiration towards that ideal naturally follows.
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 The inherent morality in the construal of the person has practical consequences. 
On is that  the acts of persons are inherently  open to judgment and action itself is 
distinguished form mere happening by its moral context. A second is that a 
presupposition for our judgment of acts is that the actor is a being who can and does think 
for herself and whose dealings with other persons has encoded a presupposition that they 
think for themselves too -- i.e talk of judgment concerning acts presupposes a person (i.e., 
a self-reflexive being and self-reflexivity presupposes sociality).
 Actions generally, but reflective rational actions particularly, are inherently  
communicative outside of their manifest content: they are inherently moral (by 
suggesting a way of being that  is open to persons) and so inherently  open to judgment. 
For example, the acts of persons communicate attitudes, towards oneself, towards others, 
towards oneself and others together.46  They communicate what  the person cared most 
about (at least in that situation); what, ultimately, was most important as that is what 
ultimately  moved him. Grasping this larger communicative aspect of actions as 
addressing personhood is grasping their moral dimension and is grasping action as a 
moral domain.47  The vocabulary  of reactive attitudes is part of a vocabulary for 
apprehending this larger communicative context, itself a narrative about personhood and 
what sort of being a person a person ought to be. It is reflected in the Kantian idea of 
“thinking morally for the first time,” taking the big picture view and understanding why 
the action is required and what one is endorsing as human conduct.48  Judgment itself 
signals recognition of that larger communication, and thereby that the actor is a person.
 Persons can take this point of view that their actions will be viewed in this moral 
context (which is not  the same as the context of right and wrong with respect to a 
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standard but of noble and base, or simply new, as an action) specifically in their own 
reflecting, but they also take is simply  in so far as they grasp that other persons will 
evaluate their action from this context/judge their action from this point  of view. One is 
thinking morally  (not necessarily of the morally good, but just in a moral sense) in so far 
as she considers her action in the context of it  as a statement about what a way for a 
person to be and acts or does not act on that ground. This is a level of exchange that only 
happens among persons, so in so far as a person takes this perspective on his own actions 
and those of other persons, he is participating with others in a way that only persons can. 
Thus, with their actions, persons participate in a moral conversation with other persons, 
each recognizing and being recognized. Through acting and being judged (subjecting 
their actions to interpretation) persons create the community  of persons. When persons, 
and each person, recognizes the personhood of other persons the reality  of both persons is 
reinforced as is the reality of persons as a kind.
 Opportunities to reflectively act is absolutely  necessary for personhood because in 
doing so the person is acting quintessentially as a person, functioning directly out of his 
nature as a person -- accessing his own evaluative and motivational structures to express 
and so disclose them in his chosen action and the account he gives. In these instances he 
is also most aware that his actions will be understood as expressions of conduct open to 
and found acceptable by  a person and that may be judged by others and that possibility  is 
included in his deliberation. Thus he is aware of himself as a person among persons and 
that by acting he is participating in this larger community of recognition.
 When engaging in thoughtful, rational action he becomes aware of his interpretive 
framework and his own persistent motivations. He becomes aware of cared about 
attachments and their strength as well as commitments unconsciously made. Most of all 
he experiences himself -- the person -- as the source of worldly effects, and therefore 
himself as a distinct, coherent, object or presence in the world. When other persons 
apprehend that, that act of apprehension is a recognition of personhood, and when 
expressed publicly in a judgment is an affirmation of personhood, a recognition of a fact. 
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Asking for and receiving an account is a quintessential person to person exchange: the 
one presupposes the other is a self-reflexive being who can and does think for himself 
and the other responds on the same presupposition, and in the exchange their 
presuppositions are validated.
 Reflective action is an absolute need of the person because of the way reasons 
connect persons to actions and thereby realize persons in the world, and the way reasons 
open the world to the person, and most especially the way reasons open the person to the 
moral reality  that is other persons. Reasons connect the person to the action by explaining 
how the person saw the circumstances what stood out about it, what other beliefs he 
thought relevant to a decision, what he saw as more and less important and why he 
thought them so. Through this process he becomes aware of his own persistent 
motivations and interpretive framework, his cared about attachments and their strengths, 
and any unconscious commitments. He becomes conscious of his depth and acquires it.
 When a person takes acting and deliberating seriously  and thoughtfully, he 
becomes, through the process acquainted with many kinds of reasons of many kinds. The 
more he becomes open to reasons and to the realities that supply them, and the more he 
learns to respond appropriately to them and the more fully he comes to know both 
himself and the world. This usefulness does not go to supporting existence of the person 
directly  but it does to making it  important to live as a person -- to pay attention and be 
stimulated by and engage with things in the world (including other people) to make living 
worthwhile and entice one to continue living, which was one of the problems originally 
posed by the self-reflexive consciousness.
 Reflective action and the opportunities it provides to express his thought in an 
account realizes the person by connecting the person to the behavior by showing it an 
action, which is done by  giving an account of his reasons. I.e., an account to show it  was 
a choice and a choice made for reasons that seemed suitable to him. By accounting, the 
person reveals how he saw the situation, what he saw as important and what  he say  as 
most important, what he saw as relevant background considerations, what he brought to 
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bear in the determination, and what ultimately  motivated his particular choice, he makes 
public some of his inner nature, and so himself (assuming the account is honest and 
accurate to the best of his ability). Because this kind of action is purest, in the sense of 
drawing most strongly  on the person’s evaluative resources, they are most expressive of 
that structure. It brings it to light  to others but also to the person himself that he is a 
person (centrally self-reflexive with a unified and structured psyche, and an ideal of the 
person at the center of that structure) but also who he is as a particular understanding of 
personhood.
 It is also very  often the case that practical situations require that choices be made 
on insufficient evidence -- unavoidable breakdowns in reasoning occur and second order 
desires turn out to be unreconcilable -- but the person must choose a course of action 
anyway.49 These situations are particularly revealing because he must simply  take a stand 
on something.
 The characteristic and appropriate form of life for empirical beings with reflexive 
self-consciousness is a life in community where they can acquire depth and become 
agents -- i.e., become persons -- and where their personhood is recognized and responded 
to by  others. If the development and use of the capability  to reflectively act is denied, the 
person cannot experience and participate in that  distinctive way of life, the proper way of 
life for his kind. This is absolute harm in itself. If he is excluded from living as his nature 
requires he will fail to develop the traits, in this case character traits, to live successfully 
as a person. In particular, rational self-control, which is essential to constituting a life out 
of your activities and a signal capacity  of persons, without which he fails to qualify as a 
person.
 If he is denied the opportunity to act or if his actions go unrecognized as actions, 
then the opportunity to account, an activity central to our functioning as persons, is also 
denied. By providing our reasons for action and the details of our deliberation we show 
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how we say the situation, what we say as salient, the background beliefs and attitudes we 
bought to bear, where we were conflicted, and how we resolved those conflicts. In 
providing our reasons we open possibilities for others to recognize similarities in attitude, 
belief, likes and dislikes, and in that way we find others that are not  only just like us in 
being persons but further like us in their particularity, drawing the person out into the 
world and more concrete relationship  with others. When some are denied the opportunity 
to act or their actions are disregarded as actions, opportunities for other people to 
function as persons (by recognizing personhood in another) are reduced.
 Since persons are recognized by having their behaviors recognized as actions, if a 
person’s actions go chronically  unrecognized as actions that person is likely to eventually 
lose the desire, having lost an important incentive, to put the required effort  and 
thoughtfulness into his practical deliberation. Over time, his practical structures may 
weaken at which point acting unreflectively out of habit or for near-term desire 
satisfaction may come to dominate. If he ceases to act out of his volitional capacity, that 
capability will eventually  diminish. If he then needs to or wants to, he may find himself 
immobilized. He becomes shallow, acting mindlessly out of habit or to satisfy desires, 
and he further loses his structure and unity as a person, perhaps eventually finding his 
identity a question to himself.
2.4 For Recognition
 
Part one of this work showed that intrinsic sociality is a basic unit of the analysis of the 
person. Persons are dependent by  definition on recognition and the ability to recognize. 
The source of intrinsic sociality  lies in central self-reflexivity with its implied need for an 
ideal of the person, which has to come from somewhere. We saw also that persons are 
both recognized and realized with a vocabulary  that is specific to persons, which again 
requires other people. Without an ideal of the person it would be difficult to see how a 
being could qualify as a person. It would lack essential motivations and organizing 
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structures, such as a life plan, a code of personal conduct, a vocabulary for assessing that 
conduct. It would not  use or be responsive to reactive attitudes -- and we saw that without 
our person specific vocabulary we would lose a key  means to expressing recognition. 
Persons would go unrecognized and so unrealized, which would call their personhood 
into question.
 In this section I address the act of recognition itself -- what recognition consists 
in. There are two things we can recognize: we can recognize agency and we can 
recognize depth. 
 Recognizing a person by recognizing depth is a different act than recognizing a 
person by recognizing agency. When recognizing agency one treats the other as a person 
with the expectation of the response of a person. If that response is forthcoming it 
confirms the initial supposition. You treat the other as a being who an and does think for 
herself, can be held responsible, can take responsibility and see if their behavior 
conforms. Recognition of depth is direct recognition of personhood. You recognize that 
the she also functions with ideals, in particular some ideal of the person that guides her 
motivation evaluations; is reflexively self-conscious and therefore subject to the same 
foundational questions and concerns as you and has come up  with her own answers; and, 
like you, has cared about attachments, some of which are central to her identity and 
motivational core.
 Josiah Royce wrote of “realizing the existence” of others this way, “What then is 
thy neighbor? He too is a mass of states, of experiences, thoughts and desires, just as 
concrete, as thou art ... Dost thou believe this? Art thou sure what it means? This is for 
thee the turning-point of thy whole conduct towards him.” Henry James wrote similarly, 
“The higher the vision of an inner significance in what, until then, we had realized only  in 
the dead external way, often comes over a person suddenly; and, when it does so, it 
makes an epoch in his history.”50
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 The emphasis in the literature has long been on recognition of agency, but 
recognition of depth is the more fundamental recognition as it  is not, as with recognition 
of agency, a recognition that you are a person or an assertion that I am a person but a 
recognition that  you are like me, a person, with cares and concerns as important  to you as 
mine are to me. The closest thing with agency might be the case of mutual promising 
(mutual holding responsible), but even there the recognition of personhood would consist 
in the recognition of similar cared about ideals of conduct rather than agency itself.
 The discussion so far has focused on the need for recognition and what is 
recognized when something is recognized to be a person. What remains is the act  of 
recognition itself.
 The absolute need of a person is very specific: to have his reality affirmed. His 
reality  is a fact and he needs that  fact made public. Thus, the act  of recognition should be 
existence affirmation. Your act of recognition should “make firm” his reality as a person. 
This supports recognition of depth as the primal recognition. It  also makes sense as a 
foundational act because, unlike respect, affirmation can be demanded. Existence 
affirmation involves no attitude. It is simply a seeing clearly  and affirming the truth that 
is there. Also, rationality presupposes a commitment to truth and therefore requires an 
openness to truth, existence affirmation can be demanded on rational as well as moral 
grounds. The same doesn’t hold for respect, which is essentially an attitude.  Affirmation 
is also a slightly stronger form of recognition than mere recognition. To recognize is 
merely to acknowledge, to affirm is to assert publicly  as a fact. So affirm is the proper 
form for recognition of a person to take.  
 An example of existence affirmation can be found in Alexander Pushkin’s short 
novel, The Captain’s Daughter. In it there is a song, a real song that was at the time very 
popular among the serf class. In the song a horse thief is brought before the Czar and 
asked to acquit himself. He replies, I stole the horses, it was my choice, I acted alone, and 
the Czar replies, You have acquitted yourself well before your Czar, for that I commend 
you. However, you are a horse thief and for that  you must hang. I think this song touched 
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a nerve just because it  captures the idea of existence affirmation. The Czar spoke as a 
person to a person and the thief responded the same. The Czar’s commendation affirms 
the thief as a person and therefore as a person among persons. The deep  desire is to have 
“that one is” (present) more so than “who one is.”51
 Recognition is not an easy task. We have many things to attend to at any one time, 
and when we do interact with other people, the person, and the interaction, is generally 
not the end but a means, or often an impediment. We interact to get information, give 
information, negotiate something; even in social situations other people mainly  serve, 
from your perspective, to fill out the activity, making it possible. It is a continual task to 
keep  it in mind to affirm personhood in others and be cognizant of the effects of our 
actions on their lives.
 I defined recognition as affirmation of existence, in other words, I defined 
recognition as the public assertion of the fact of another person’s existence, so I need to 
say something about what  that would consist in. Public assertion means only that the 
assertion must have some expression outside the head of the one who recognized, as the 
recognition only fulfills its function if the one recognized realizes she has been 
recognized. We only need to look back on the absolute needs of the person for behavior 
that would support the existence of the person recognized, and to the recognizer as well. 
Here are some: 1) recognizing that  she too has cared about attachments important  to her 
as yours are to you; 2) permitting her the space to make autonomous free choices and act 
on them; 3) asking her to account; 4) exchanging reasons; 5) recognizing her actions as 
actions; 6) recognizing that her actions are also disclosures; and 7) recognizing her efforts 
to live by her ideal by displaying reactive attitudes. Also, since recognition is of depth 
there are many small ways -- subtle physical clues to personhood learned as infants, such 
as a smile or recognition, a certain eye gaze -- to show you’ve recognized she is a person 
too.
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